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Despite its longevity, the concept of the ‘informal sector’ has been mired in theoreti-
cal debate and critique ever since it was coined by anthropologist Keith Hart (1973)
to describe the unreported economic activity of unemployed young men in Accra. In
Portes et al.’s (1989) seminal volume on the informal sector, Fortuna and Prates (1989:
78) describe it as a ‘(pre)concept in search of a theory’. Hart (2006) now laments its
transformation into a ‘jargon word’ and the consequent loss of analytical precision. I
situate this article within a strand of research that focuses on hybrid formalities and
informalities (cf. Mica, 2016) and argue that para-formality characterises the condition
of Uruguayan waste-pickers before, and quasi-formality after, their incorporation into
state-sponsored recycling plants.
Latin American waste-pickers have, in recent years, been the subject of much politi-
cal, cultural and academic attention. Various state and non-state actors across cities like
Buenos Aires, Asunción, Curitiba, and Bogotá have promoted programmes of ‘inclu-
sive recycling’, which see waste-pickers organised into collectives and given formal or
semi-formal jobs with access to social security (Gutberlet, 2008; Scheinberg and Simp-
son, 2015; Carenzo, 2016). According to Medina’s (2005: 17) classification of state
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approaches to waste-picking, such policies are an example of ‘stimulation’, in that they
recognise ‘the economic, social, and environmental benefits of scavenging and recycling’.
Yet recent studies have also questioned whether the inclusion of waste-pickers in waste
management schemes in places like Soweto, Rio de Janeiro, and Buenos Aires is bene-
ficial for workers and ultimately contributes to social justice (Sternberg, 2013; Samson,
2015; Millar, 2018).
This article analyses a particular labour formalisation scheme aimed at waste-pickers
(known as clasificadores) in the Uruguayan capital of Montevideo: a set of four recycling
plants constructed in 2014 as part of a packaging/container law (the Ley de Envases),
incorporating 128 clasificadores. The recycling scheme is consistent with a general move
to reduce informal employment by the centre-left Frente Amplio coalition (FA, Broad
Front), which has been in national government in Uruguay for over a decade. Accord-
ing to Uruguayan government figures, informal workers as a proportion of the general
working population fell from 35 percent to 25 percent between 2006 and 2014 (MIDES
and OPP, 2015). The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates an even higher
drop – 15 percent between 2004 and 2012 (FORLAC, 2014) – while a study com-
missioned by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (CEPAL) estimates a 17 percent decrease between 2004 and 2014 (Amarante
and Gomez, 2016).
Drawing on Whitson’s (2011) characterisation of Buenos Aires’s waste as ‘out of
place’ and of ‘zero value’ but with ‘commodity potential’ nonetheless, we might say that
the Ley de Envases represents an attempt to recognise the value inherent in waste, and
to move ‘out of place’ waste-pickers from city streets into recycling plants (Figures 1
and 2). In many ways, the law should be a model for inclusive recycling in the region.
It provides social security to vulnerable workers – many of whom gained access to a
state pension, sick pay, and an aguinaldo (yearly bonus) for the first time – and includes
private-sector companies as voluntary signatories to the ‘polluter pays’ principle and
funders of workers’ wages. It offers a potentially successful example of a non-profit,
public-private partnership, a model that Kruljac (2012) recommends for the Latin Amer-
ican waste management sector. Finally, it accomplishes the long-touted policy goal of
enabling waste-pickers to sell directly to industry rather than to intermediaries, at much
more favourable rates.
However, as revealed by my ethnographic fieldwork at the Aries Ley de Envases
plant from May to December 2014, clasificadores were not altogether happy with the
formalisation of their labour. A significant number left the plant to return to informal
economic activity, whether the semi-clandestine recovery of materials at the city land-
fill or the cleaning of upper-class apartments. Primarily, this article seeks to understand
why, given the apparent benefits that the Ley de Envases plants conferred, some work-
ers should seek to leave so quickly and thus aims to reveal potential weak points in
formalisation schemes more broadly. Previous fieldwork with waste-pickers in their for-
mer workplace, the Cooperativa Felipe Cardoso (COFECA) – a recycling cooperative
situated next to Montevideo’s landfill – revealed ways in which the new plant brought
comparative disadvantages as well as benefits.
After a discussion of informality in the following section, this article describes the
organisation of labour at COFECA, a cooperative I characterise as ‘para-formal’, in
that it exists in parallel to formal labour arrangements and to some degree imitates
them, whilst also entering the grey zone of (il)legality suggested by the prefix. I outline
the desirable attributes that the disbanded cooperative possessed, such as flexibility and
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Figure 1. Recycling in Montevideo Pre-Ley de Envases
Source: LKSur Associates (2005: 41). Design: Mary Freedman
what workers referred to as a ‘parallel social security system’. I then discuss the out-
come of the initial move from COFECA to Aries and highlight a number of conflicts
and difficulties that stemmed from the institutional confusion of clasificadores with the
extreme poor, and from an understanding of the informal sector waste trade that dwells
on exploitation and neglects solidarity. The final section, noting that most workers nev-
ertheless remained at the Planta Aries, argues that they were able to do so because latent
informal economic activity sustained the Ley de Envases labour formalisation project,
at least in its infancy. Here I propose the concept of ‘quasi-formalisation’ as a useful
heuristic for understanding how continued informal activity actively can actively sustain
projects of Latin American labour formalisation.
Discussing (In)formality
One key problem with the formal/informal binary is the difficulty of classifying jobs,
persons, or sectors as wholly one thing or the other. Take the example of what a Brazilian
market seller offered:
Marta got a formal loan from a formal bank to sell food in an informal
settlement without paying all formal taxes on her business but bought prod-
ucts from a formal supermarket in the formal city. Into which box would
that case go? (Doherty and Lino e Silva, 2011: 34–35)
Such entanglements of formal and informal economic activity, the use of incommensu-
rable national metrics, and the supposed failure of the binary to saymuch about workers’
experience of their own labour have led some scholars to abandon it entirely (e.g. Mil-
lar, 2018). The current intellectual trend is to address the question of precarity instead,
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Figure 2. Recycling in Montevideo Post-Ley de Envases
Source: Interview conducted with R Santos (Manager Planta Aries) 6.9.14
Design: Mary Freedman
although this concept has its own weaknesses (see Breman, 2013; Munck, 2013). Fer-
nández (2012, 2012) avoids using a formal/informal heuristic to separate Uruguayan
waste-pickers from official waste management actors, opting instead for ‘institutional’
and ‘spontaneous’. Municipal waste management is not entirely ‘formal’, she argues,
because the Intendencia (local government) cannot guarantee that all collected waste
stays in the formal sector. Meanwhile clasificador activity is spontaneous instead of
informal, because it is self-emergent and because, as elsewhere in the ‘Global South’,
there is not much of a ‘formal’ recycling sector to which it can be compared (Fernández,
2012: 2).
This article, unlike the work of Fernández, deals with an explicit attempt to for-
malise part of the waste recovery and recycling chain, and to transform clasificadores
from cooperative workers with flexible labour hours and cash-in-hand payments into
employees with fixed working hours and formal wage deductions/contributions. This
is indicative of a key development that has occurred since Hart’s original concep-
tualisation: the informal/formal binary has ceased to be a purely analytical device
used by social scientists. It is now also an ethnographic term encountered by schol-
ars studying the implementation of labour policy across the globe – one that is
explicit in policy documents and influential in shaping people’s orientation to life
and labour. In this context, I would argue that it is inappropriate to discard the term
entirely.
Assuming that the number of urban informal sector workers is evenly distributed
across urban space, Montevideo, which has 42 percent of the country’s urban popula-
tion, was home to 142,800 informal sector workers in 2014 (Amarante and Gomez,
2016). The most recent survey of Montevidean clasificadores, carried out by the Inten-
dencia deMontevideo (IM) (2012) and based on a representative sample, estimated their
© 2019 The Authors. Bulletin of Latin American Research published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
on behalf of the Society for Latin American Studies.
56 Bulletin of Latin American Research Vol. 39, No. 1
We Looked after People Better when We Were Informal
number at 3188. This figure is contested: the clasificador trade union uses the total num-
ber of clasificadores registered with the Intendencia, 7000, which it multiplies to 21,000
to include dependents potentially involved in the domestic classification of waste (Reilly,
2017). Depending on the figures consulted then, the proportion of clasificadores within
Montevideo’s informal sector workforce can be assumed to lie between 2.2 and 4.9
percent.
However, this seemingly small percentage belies the importance placed on
waste-pickers by Uruguay’s social state. Clasificadores were the only occupational
group to be given a social programme and department of their own – Program Uruguay
Clasifica (PUC, Uruguay Classifies Programme), within the Ministerio de Desarollo
Social (MIDES, Ministry of Social Development) – after the FA’s 2005 Plan de Atención
Nacional a la Emergencia Social (PANES, National Social Emergency Plan) identified
them as a complex, vulnerable group exposed to multiple risks. Despite the even smaller
number of clasificadores included in Montevideo’s Ley de Envases plants −128, of
whom 38 work at Aries – the plants constitute an instructive case study of wider
sociological significance for several reasons.
First, clasificadores employed by the plants underwent a substantive change in their
working conditions as they moved from semi-autonomous work at the landfill, in coop-
eratives, or on the streets, to formal conditions of employment at the plants. Fixed
working hours, workplace discipline, access to social security, and regulated economic
activity make the plants a paradigmatic example of a labour formalisation programme.
Themonotributo social, a reduced-rate income tax that ostensibly brought about amuch
larger decrease in informal Uruguayan labour in terms of percentage, did not signifi-
cantly alter the circumstances of that (informal) labour.
Second, the Ley de Envases represents an interesting example of the kind of social
policy introduced by the left-leaning Latin American governments elected in the 2000s.
Panizza (2008) suggests that the FA’s policies during its first year in office (2005) can
be divided into those which ‘adopted’, ‘completed’, or ‘corrected’ the pro-market poli-
cies of the previous neoliberal governments. The Ley de Envases was passed in 2004,
shortly before the FA came into power, but the changes and specifications that occurred
nationally, in 2007, and in Montevideo, in 2013, were carried out by FA governments.
Through a study of the Ley de Envases and its implementation, it is thus possible to
observe whether the FA brought continuity or rupture to Uruguayan recycling policy
and beyond.
Rather than an aerial-view policy study, however, this article relies on in-depth ethno-
graphic research conducted over the course of a year in and aroundMontevideo’s largest
landfill. During 2014, I lived in a housing cooperative where the majority of residents
were waste-pickers relocated from a shantytown situated on top of an old landfill. As
well as participating in the wider life of the community – including football matches,
birthday parties, and cock-fights – I set out each day to engage in participant observa-
tion with waste-pickers, classifying waste in a range of nearby sites. This was comple-
mented by over 70 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with waste-pickers, municipal
waste managers, and private-sector and NGO actors.
Participatory methods, supplemented by interview data, are appropriate for an
exploration of how labour formalisation policies are perceived by workers and affect
their subjectivities and temporalities. Without spending large amounts of time getting
my hands dirty in the plants, it would have been difficult to critically engage with
the official statistics on the quantity of waste being recycled, the number of workers
being formalised, and, crucially, the nature of that formalisation. The conceptual
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apparatus of ‘para-formality’ and ‘quasi-formality’ that I propose here is designed
to capture workers’ experiences, taking seriously their claims about formality and
informality, such as Porteño’s opinion that ‘the government should keep the recy-
cling plants for horse-and-cart waste-pickers [carreros], because our cooperative is
practically formal already due to our parallel social security system’. By critically
engaging with formalisation rather than assuming its inevitable desirability, the article
reinvigorates Hart’s original challenge: is formalisation always a means to the end of a
better life for precarious workers, or do we sometimes only ‘want to shift the emphasis
of income opportunities in the direction of formal employment for its own sake?’
(1973: 81).
Para-Formality and Vernacular Cooperativism at COFECA
When workers signed their contracts at the Planta Aries, most came directly from
the COFECA recycling cooperative, situated on the old landfill of the Usina 5, just a
few hundred metres from the currently active landfill, the Usina 8. COFECA emerged
out of a 2012 struggle at the landfill. When waste-pickers were denied access to the site
and its materials by the Intendencia, they responded by blocking the entry of trucks.
Following negotiations, they were subsequently granted permission to work, first on a
small road separating two landfills (Usina 6/7), and then at the Usina 5 – on the con-
dition that they organised themselves as a cooperative. This stipulation stemmed from
the then-hegemonic social policy, which advocated labour cooperatives for the poor
and waste-pickers in particular (PUC, 2006, 2008; Martí, 2012: 65).
When I first approached COFECA in early 2014 to ask if I could work with the
group, the cooperative was on the cusp of change. The number of workers had declined
from 150 to 40, who operated in two slightly conflictive groups. Yet it was still the
largest waste-picker cooperative in the country. Workers were awaiting a long-promised
relocation to a new plant, had different opinions about the move, but accepted that they
would have little choice in the matter because the closure of the Usina 5 site and the
disbanding of COFECA were presented to them as compulsory. Just a few years earlier,
these waste-pickers had been obliged to form a cooperative at the Usina 5 in order to
continue recycling; now they would be forced to become employees at a plant to do so.
Aspersions were cast on the cooperative by officials involved in rolling out the Ley de
Envases, so as to justify its forced disbanding and the incorporation of workers into the
new plants. COFECA was branded ‘not a cooperative at all’ by a MIDES official, and
as a cooperativa enferma (‘sick cooperative’) by an NGO coordinator at the plant.
I worked for several months at the site that clasificadores shared with cats, dogs,
chickens, horses, maggots, flies, and surprisingly rare rats. COFECA functioned as a
cooperative in the sense that it was a collective viewed as a cooperative by its members,
but it operated in the ‘informal sector’ with regard to the sale of recyclables and
lacked the trappings of formality (legal status, a working constitution, assemblies,
etc.). In the absence of regular meetings, decision-making was messy and inflected with
power relations of gender, kinship, and neighbourhood. It was this dynamic that led
officials – estranged from COFECA for several years – to describe it in terms of lack
or degeneracy.
Yet the group did exhibit important elements of cooperativism. There was equal pay
based on attendance and what workers referred to as a ‘parallel social security system’.
If a member was sick or if they had to attend to a sick child, they would receive a
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share of the income from the sale of recyclables. Workers might receive this sick pay
for a single day, but they could also collect the payment for months or even years, as in
the case of Juana, who received wages from the cooperative for eighteenmonths while
in hospital recovering from serious surgery. A single mother with four children, Juana
would otherwise have been in serious economic hardship. Another benefit that mim-
icked the formal sector was the payment of an aguinaldo (yearly bonus). In the case of
COFECA, the aguinaldo consisted of a loan – deducted from payments over the course
of the year – from the intermediaries who bought recyclables from the cooperative.
I found that buyers regularly lent sums of money, often at zero interest, to the clasi-
ficadores from whom they bought materials. Such loans could be made in times of
hardship or emergency, or if the clasificador did not have material to sell (because of
temporary closure of the landfill, for example) and would thus be without income on a
given week. As recent ethnographic research (e.g. James, 2014) on debt suggests, the old
stereotype of the informal sector ‘loan shark’ and the powerlessness of the debtor does
not always tell the full story.
In this case, clasificador debts to compradores (buyers) often went unpaid. Rather
than allow a debt to be deducted from the sale of materials, clasificadores would often
switch buyer, although they could obviously not do this indefinitely. In the case of
COFECA, the group had contracted large – ultimately unpaid – debts to long-time
comprador Stefano. Stefano appeared to hold no grudges, telling me that he had made
a lot of money buying and selling COFECA’s mercadería (merchandise) over the years.
It was not so much that compradores were generous, but rather that their margins were
wide enough to factor in an acceptable and expected level of unpaid debt.
At COFECA, income earned from the sale of stock recyclables like plastic, paper, and
metal was also complemented by requeche, or ‘leftovers’, the term that workers gave to
the clothes, foodstuffs, ornaments, and appliances that they recovered from the trash for
household consumption or sale. Clasificadores during the week, many workers doubled
up as market stall-holders on Sundays at Piedras Blancas, the largest flea market in the
city. At what one informant called the ‘supermarket of the poor’, value was re-inscribed
onto the rejected things that clasificadores extracted from the waste-stream as they were
remarketed as low-cost commodities. COFECA workers Hojita, Sergio, and Nín had
adjoining stalls, and I often stopped with them to relax after a week’s work and observe
the sale of requeche. Although their display depended on what entered COFECA on a
given week, workers often made as much, or more, from Piedras Blancas as they did
from the sale of stock recyclables.
There is much more to say about the ‘vernacular’ (Merry, 2006; Sorroche, 2016)
cooperativism that I encountered at COFECA, but this brief account suffices to indicate
that there was no absence of structure, content, or form. Confusion about the legal
status of COFECA among its workers, coupled with their ‘parallel system’, led some
to consider themselves as formal workers already. Estranged from institutional support,
workers had developed their own ‘para-formal’ individual and collective strategies for
getting by ‘del día al día’ (from day to day).
The concept of para-formality has been used to describe economic activities that are
in some way structured or organised but are not governed by the same legal framework
as state-registered businesses. Thus, there are Polish ‘parabanks’, the ‘local variant for
non-bank financial institutions and financial intermediaries which provide activities sim-
ilar to traditional banks, yet without being licensed or monitored by these’ (Mica, 2016:
146). ForMica, the ‘downside’ of the prefix is that it is ‘depreciatory and even suggestive
of ‘illegal undertakings’ (Mica, 2016). Yet I would argue that this feature is a strength
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for my analysis, because for certain sections of the state, the recovery and sale of waste
on the black market is indeed regarded as illegal.
Although they could fathom the advantages of a move to the Planta Aries, workers
at COFECA hardly had nothing to lose. Indeed, they had the para-formality of flexible
black-market loans, a parallel social security system, and a substantial income earned
from the recovery and sale of requeche. The words of a worried older worker, Sergio,
encapsulated some workers’ fears that a new job in the plant might undermine rather
than enhance income and job security:
Requeche will not exist at the plant… if you find a watch or money, you’ll
have to hand it in… I’ll be bossed around and to be bossed around at 60
when I have always worked individually, that’ll be difficult. If they come
and shout ‘you can’t smoke, you can’t go to the toilet three times, there’s
no reason to stop’, how long will I last in the job? Two days? Then what’ll
I do?... Who’ll give me work at my age? (interview, Sergio, 3.3.14)
Informal Assumptions and Formal Realities
The Planta Aries, like Montevideo’s other three Ley de Envases plants, was inaugurated
with much fanfare in 2014. A large marquee was erected and packed with civil ser-
vants and future workers, while Montevideo Mayor Ana Olivera and representatives
of the various organisations involved in the construction and management of the plants
sat at a head table. Speeches from officials tempered self-congratulation and idealism
with a recognition that much was still to be achieved. Ana Olivera described the cre-
ation of the plants as ‘the achievement of the impossible’, while the head of the Instituto
Nacional de Formación Professional (INEFOP, National Institute for Professional Train-
ing) argued that the workers were to experience ‘a radical change’. The head of the
Uruguayan Chamber of Commerce (CIU), meanwhile, said that the plants represented a
model for joint collaboration between the public and private sectors. The contribution
of companies that had voluntarily signed up to the packaging plan, he said, were reflected
in the plants’ ‘infrastructure, machinery, wages and work tools’. The Aries clasificadores
who were invited to say a few words were more circumspect, with Julia saying that while
she hoped the move would be for the best, the starting salary wasn’t very good, and the
public recycling campaign needed to be improved. Hojita, meanwhile, stressed that the
group had come from a cooperative background, and expressed his hopes that promises
made to the newly employed workers would be kept.
A few months after its inauguration, work had begun at the Planta Aries, but early
starts and multiple bus connections, fixed shifts, a convoluted management structure,
and a dreaded toilet cleaning rota were taking their toll on workers’ morale. There were
clashes between the NGO and workers unaccustomed to management, but the princi-
pal complaint concerned wages. A temporary municipal subsidy had run out and the
income earned from sale of materials to industry was, after deductions, much less than
the Intendencia had fatefully suggested to the press (El Observador, 2014). Earnings
consisted primarily of a US$260 monthly minimum wage.
This should not necessarily have been a problem and had not been anticipated as
such by the state bodies involved. The failure to foresee wage unrest stemmed in part
from two assumptions made about the informal sector waste trade in Uruguay: first,
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that clasificadores were synonymous with the poor; second, that describing such work-
ers as victims of exploitation was an exhaustive account of their economic condition.
In effect, this is a hybrid of the traditional ILO position, which confuses the informal
sector with the poor, and the ‘structuralist’ school (Chen, 2012), which understands the
informal economy as being made up of ‘subordinated economic units [… ] and work-
ers that serve to reduce input and labour costs of large capitalist firms’ (Chen, 2012:
488). The structuralist position, developed by Portes and his collaborators in the 1990s,
is now predominant in Uruguayan scholarship on clasificadores. Sarachu et al. (2013):
4), for instance, argues that clasificación is a ‘productive complex’ where ‘the enormous
profit margins of recycling firms are based on the hidden exploitation of the work of the
clasificador’. Villalba (2009: 6) likewise concludes that ‘clasificadores’ current work-
ing conditions represent a clear case of economic exploitation disguised as independent
activity’. With the Ley de Envases, Uruguayan government policy merges a structuralist
understanding of formal/informal connections in the recycling industry with policy solu-
tions more familiar to the old ILO position, which viewed informal workers as part of
an excess labour supply and sought to challenge informality through public and private
investment in the creation of formal sector jobs (cf. Portes and Schauffler, 1993: 54).
According to one worker, Nín, state and non-state actors presumed that those enter-
ing the plants were so poor as to be appreciative of a handout:
I wasn’t born here [at the dump]. I finished school and have a plumber’s
qualification: I am not a nobody. Back there [at COFECA], I lived better, I
had a better income than here. Since they saw us all dirty, ‘ah these guys are
tremendous píchis [a derogatory Uruguayan term used for waste-pickers or
tramps], we’ll give them 200 pesos and they’ll be delighted’. That’s what
they imagined. (interview, Nín, 5.6.14)
In Nín’s account, COFECA clasificadores could be confused for the extreme poor
because they were clothed in the rags, dirt, and smells of their workplace. In fact,
clasificadores at both the landfill and COFECA had a defined set of ‘rubbish clothes’,
a pseudo-uniform that often consisted of other workers’ overalls recovered from the
trash. After work, clasificadores would get changed back into the more common (male)
‘uniform’ of the Uruguayan popular classes: a pair of Nike trainers, tracksuits and
skip-caps, or jeans and t-shirts. According to oral histories that I collected, washing and
changing clothes at the landfill had a long history, and meant that clasificadores could
get off the bus at a stop near the dump and return without revealing their occupation.
I bore witness to other assumptions made about clasificadores during the training
sessions they underwent with INEFOP in preparation for work in the formal economy.
On one occasion, Franco asked about parking facilities for his horse and cart and was
told by the workshop facilitator that these would not be appropriate at the plant. ‘What
about the two cars I have in the garage?’ he insisted. Parking needs had been ‘estimated
based on the type of people entering the plant’, she responded, and clasificadores were
not expected to own cars. ‘If we were seen building recycling plants for people with cars’,
one Environment Ministry official explained when I raised the incident in an interview,
‘then we would be questioned by international organisations who would ask what this
had to do with the eradication of poverty’. Although international bodies did not fund
the plants directly, the economic heterogeneity of clasificadores seemed to embarrass
officials.
Peattie’s (1987: 857) warning that ‘“the informal sector” is by no means equivalent
to “the poor”’ and that ‘there is plenty of evidence that incomes among small-scale
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entrepreneurs cover a great range from extreme poverty to well over average’ remains
relevant in Uruguay today. As Portes and Schauffler (1993: 46) note in a critique of
the association of informality with poverty, ‘the original reason for coining the con-
cept of informality and the present justification for its analysis lie in its distinctness
from sheer poverty. If the two were equivalent, there would be no reason for invent-
ing a new term’. Most clasificadores were, generally speaking, poor, even if estimates of
their incomes varied wildly (the 2006 PANES estimated individual clasificador income
to average only US$17 per month, for example, while the 2015 household study put
the figure at closer to US$203). Yet some of my informants took home considerable
weekly wages, while others had managed a ‘primitive accumulation’ in the waste trade.
Some doubled up as small-time recycling intermediaries; others made money at market.
Amongst COFECA/Aries workers, Hormiga had amassed wealth as a burglar before
being born again as an evangelical Christian; his brother Bicho owned seven houses in
different shantytowns; their nephew Rojo owned a car; and another nephew, Porteño,
possessed a beautifully restored vintage Ford.When Porteño did not come to work in the
truck, he borrowed the four-wheel drive that belonged to his father, a former glass trader
turned small-scale importer. ‘Being a clasificador doesn’t mean that you are living in the
mud or eating out of a can’, Porteño told me; ‘that’s not dignified for anyone’. Perhaps
to prove his point, he arrived at the plant’s press-heavy inauguration in the four-wheel
drive.
Officials to whom I spoke in the Intendencia were suspicious of those who had made
money in the informal sector, with the informal coming to be associated with the illegal
or illegitimate. Porteño, for example, was reckoned to be a delinquentewho had become
rich by appropriating and selling glass bottles at COFECA. Yet he had openly classified
and sold these bottles and had been permitted to do so by the cooperative because of
their low market value. Porteño in fact made most of his money from hiring out his
truck, and from the small shop that his wife ran out of their home. Porteño’s cousin
Enrique, who worked classifying at the landfill and occasionally dropped workers off
at Aries in his shiny new Volkswagen, was presumed to owe his wealth to the labour
of peons working for him, whereas in fact he mostly worked alone. These inaccuracies
do not mean that clasificadores, or even Aries workers, did not make money from illicit
or exploitative practices, but they do suggest that in the enthusiastic drive to formalise
labour and waste, the informal sector took on unsubstantiated criminal associations in
institutional imaginaries. The kind of ethnographic research engaged in for this article is
able to go beyond such ideological denunciations and provide greater empirical accuracy,
demonstrating ethical spaces of value creation that, as we shall see, can continue to
subsidise labour in formalisation schemes.
Alongside the assumed association between poverty and informality prominent in the
ILO position, the minimumwage was also imagined to be sufficient for workers, I would
argue, because of a narrow institutional focus on the exploitative nature of informal
sector relations (PUC, 2006, 2008). This second hypothesis is much more closely allied
to the structuralist understanding of informal/formal relations pioneered by Portes and
advocated by sociologists like Jan Breman (2013). Regardless of the low wages, would
workers not be happy to be freed from the voracious jaws of exploitative intermediaries
who had profited from their lack of social protection? Yet, as we have seen, the clasi-
ficador/comprador relationship also involved the granting of loans and an aguinaldo
that were often not reimbursed. A structuralist understanding of the informal economy
centred on exploitation obfuscates the value that such institutions had for workers like
those of COFECA.
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A long-held objective of government attempts to collectivise and formalise clasifi-
cadores has been to remove the exploitative intermediaries to whom they sold materials,
thereby shortening the chain that links clasificadores and industry (Figures 1 and 2). Yet
rather than simply cutting a link in the recycling chain, the Ley de Envases replaced one
intermediary with a series of others. These included MIDES, the Intendencia, the CIU,
the NGOs managing the plants, and the bodies charged with the sale of materials. For
example, NGO plant supervisors initially earned double, and coordinators quadruple,
the wage of clasificadores, who were not ignorant of this fact, nor particularly pleased
with it. The convoluted chain of command and management structure, which included
various new intermediaries necessitated by the formal sale of materials, constitute an
example of the kind of formal sector bureaucracy that lead many of the world’s poor
workers to eschew it (cf. De Soto, 2002). ‘Our problems [at the plant]’, recounted Julia,
‘are due to the number of institutions that accompany us: each has different responsi-
bilities, and this is difficult for us to understand’ (IM, 2015: 145).
Instead of filling a void, or abolishing purely negative labour relations, it is my con-
tention that the Ley de Envases replaced ‘para-formal’ structures that already existed
in the informal sector waste trade. It replaced the ‘parallel social security’ of COFECA
with state social security; it replaced loans from recycling middlemen with those from
high street lenders; and it replaced informal intermediaries with a whole range of state
and non-state intermediaries.
Quasi-Formality: From Whitening the Black to Shades of Grey
The argument that formalisation might fail to meet the expectations of workers who
stand to lose their previous para-formal arrangements is hardly revolutionary. Any
balanced study of formalisation should probably conclude that the process invariably
entails both advantages and disadvantages for workers. In this section, I go a step
further by arguing that the Ley de Envases did not in fact represent a fully-fledged
process of labour formalisation at all. In asking why a majority of workers remained
at the Planta Aires, and how they were able to do so, I conclude that the Ley de Envases
plants constitute an example of ‘quasi-formalisation’, where informal economic activity
continues to subsidise a reorganised formal market in urban recyclables.
Ostensibly, Sergio’s fears about the restricted recovery of requeche at Aries were
realised. When I interviewed a CIU representative, he told me that workers were not per-
mitted to remove materials from plants and sell them on individually at market because
this would involve ‘fomenting the informal sector’. They should instead concentrate
on recovering the packaging that the companies which paid their wages released into
the economy and environment, I was told. In addition, only household waste could
be received by the plants. Valuable material from factories and workshops that had
previously gone to COFECA was prohibited, because managers did not legally have
permission to deal with commercial waste. The municipal government also struggled to
find a formal sector buyer for certain materials, but worker demands to sell it ‘on the
black’ were resisted for similar reasons.
Authorities responsible for implementing the Ley de Envases were effectively taking
a black-and-white stance, trying to exclude anything that hinted at informal sector prac-
tices in an attempt to blanquear (‘whiten’) the recycling industry (see Lazar, 2012: 16).
However, the fact that the FA allied itself with formal capital and its representatives in the
implementation of the Ley de Envases does not necessarily mean that the party adopted
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a neoliberal policy outlook. A focus on the inclusion and formalisation of vulnerable
waste-pickers was not central to the original law passed in 2004, and the emphasis on
tackling vulnerable work and poverty that emerged through the law’s implementation
was characteristic of the FA government’s attempt to insert a social clause into market
arrangements without fundamentally restructuring them. To take just one paradigmatic
example, although then finance minister Danilo Astori refused to countenance a default
of IMF loans, and submitted his first three-year economic plan to be approved by the
IMF in 2006, he did insert a clause seeking a sharp reduction in poverty. This was, as
Panizza (2008: 189) notes, ‘in contrast to the absence of any references to the alleviation
of poverty in the previous government’s submissions to the IMF’.
Thus, it would be inaccurate to describe FA recycling policy as demonstrating conti-
nuity with the neoliberalism of its predecessors, a critique that can be found in analyses
of waste-picker and waste policy in South Africa (Miraftab, 2004; Samson, 2015)
and Argentina (Sternberg, 2013). The FA’s policy of promoting labour formalisation
is roughly aligned with that of the ILO and Uruguay’s trade union federation, the
PIT-CNT – with whom it maintains an increasingly corporatist relationship (Panizza,
2008) – whilst falling short of the expectations of the Unión de Clasificadores de
Residuos Solidos Urbanos (Union of Solid Urban Waste Classifiers), the more radical
trade union that represents clasificadores. The emphasis that the FA places on selecting
those with a background in informal waste classification to work in new recycling
plants continues to rile representatives of Uruguay’s business elites (see CIU, 2016).
In any case, despite public servants aligning themselves with the objectives of formal
capital vis-à-vis the repression of informal economic activity in the recycling sector, the
everyday management of the Aries plant entailed dealing with various shades of grey.
As James Scott notes, it is useful to distinguish ‘facts on paper from facts on the ground’
(1998: 49). Whilst sorting waste at the plant, I noted thatManichean policies went unen-
forced by the NGO, whose coordinator argued that if he prevented clasificadores from
taking requeche home openly, they would inevitably attempt to do so surreptitiously.
So workers freely jostled to load materials onto the belt, since this afforded them first
choice on any valuable objects. Nín even managed two separate categories from his
station: one for food scraps that he gave to a neighbourhood contact in exchange for
marijuana; another for objects that could be sold at market. Workers also found other
informal methods of supplementing their income, with one middle-aged female worker
selling schnitzel sandwiches to her colleagues at lunchtime.
With regard to the sale of recyclables, workers also took actions that had the effect
of re-establishing links to the informal sector. Despite objections from the Intenden-
cia, workers telephoned Stefano and sold him black plastic, for which he paid in cash
that workers distributed amongst themselves. Concerning the arrival of recyclables, one
NGO coordinator also admitted the entry of trucks containing materials that did not
come from approved sources. ‘If a truck comes with useful material for the plant, it’ll
enter’, he confirmed in an interview. ‘I know that the plants were built for the Ley de
Envases but today the law isn’t covering the workers’ needs [… ] we cannot bury a truck
of paper just because it’s not covered by the law’.
The NGO even allowed workers to re-establish some elements of their previous ‘par-
allel social security system’. For example, they extended insurance coverage to include
not only the sick, but also those caring for sick relatives. When María’s husband had
a heart attack and she was absent at his bedside for several weeks, workers voted to
include her in the dividend of the sale of material for the duration of that time. On
another occasion, new workers at the plant were excluded from the sale of material that
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they had classified during their first few weeks’ employment, because they could not be
registered in time. ‘We’re formal now but we looked after people better when we were
informal’, Hojita complained. Nín was outraged and organised for each worker to pay
US$1 to their new colleagues as a gesture of goodwill.
Instead of containing things in the formal sector, the NGO allowed the container law
to be quietly ignored at various crucial junctures, enabling rogue materials to flow into
the plant and requeche to spill out onto informal sector markets. The sale of recyclables
‘on the black’, the arrival of contraband trucks brimming with white paper, the trade
in requeche at flea markets, the lunchtime flurry of sandwich-making: these activities
all constitute examples of informal economic activity that continued at the plants, and
indeed subsidised workers’ meagre minimum wages. They make it more accurate to
speak of the Ley de Envases plants as an example of ‘quasi-formalisation’, one where
those operating Ley de Envases infrastructure at the coalface were obliged to turn a blind
eye to informal economic activity in order to prevent labour unrest.
In the context of employment in East-Central Europe, Williams and Padmore use the
term ‘quasi-formal employment’ to describe situations where ‘formal employers some-
times pay their formal employees not only an official declared salary but also an addi-
tional undeclared wage’ (Williams and Padmore, 2013: 72). The aim of their research
is to ‘challenge the separateness of formal and informal employment by showing how
formal employment is, in practice, often infused with illegitimate wage arrangements’
(ibid.). My adaptation of the term as ‘quasi-formalisation’ for the Latin American con-
text highlights that even programmes which explicitly set out to shrink the informal
sector may themselves be subsidised by informal economic activity in ways long recog-
nised by the structuralist approach. Such an argument echoes that made by James Scott
in his discussion of state-building programmes of standardisation and collectivisation,
where he suggests that ‘formal order [… ] is always and to some considerable degree par-
asitic on informal processes, which the formal scheme does not recognise, without which
it could not exist, andwhich it alone cannot create ormaintain’ (Scott, 1998: 310). In this
case, the undeclared wage or perquisite of requeche is allowed in order to keep the Ley de
Envases plants on life support. It supplemented ameagre minimumwage paid to workers
who, though used to working in the trash, were not, as one worker put it, ‘dirt poor’.
Conclusion
Through a case study of the formalisation of a group of Uruguayan waste-pickers, this
article has argued that informal economic activity should not be confused with absence
of structure or understood in purely negative terms. Processes of labour formalisation
will inevitably substitute already existing structures which may well hold certain affor-
dances and benefits for workers. Even if collectives such as COFECA are estranged from
state bodies, they might operate ‘vernacular’ systems of social security, and possess fea-
tures normally associated with formal sector employment, such as stability. In this case,
the facilities substituted in the process of formalisation included credit and intermedia-
tion, and the replacements offered were not always clearly advantageous to the workers.
Uruguayan civil servants implementing the Ley de Envases assumed that workers
would be happy with a minimum wage and the associated benefits of formal social
security. This is because they underestimated, or were uninterested in, the extent of what
I have here termed the ‘para-formal’ dimensions of unregulated waste work, because
they dwelt only on the exploitative and negative aspects of such work, and because they
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confused waste-workers with an undifferentiated or extreme poor. In fact, the sector is
significantly diverse, with the ragged uniform sported by rag-pickers at work disguising
their heterogeneity.
Most Aries workers voted with their feet to stay in the plant, at least at the time
of writing. This is partly due, I have argued, to the ways in which they were partic-
ipating not in a simple black-and-white informal-formal transition but in a process
of ‘quasi-formalisation’, where informal economic activities were coterminous with
processes of labour formalisation. While such activities subsidise and lower labour costs
for capital, they can also help sustain low-wage formal sector employment. Building
on this article’s argument, it is important to explore where else in Latin America
state-championed policies of labour formalisation are actually subsidised by unaudited
‘para-formal’ economic activities, complicating celebratory statistics, and disturbing
stubborn binaries.
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